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Anti-social motives explain increased risk aversion for others in
decisions from experience
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Abstract
When deciding for others based on explicitly described odds and outcomes, people often have different risk preferences for
others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we examine risk preference for others where people learn about
the odds and outcomes by experiencing them through sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse
for others than for themselves, but only when the risky option had a higher expected value. Furthermore, based on a separate
set of choices, we classified people as pro- or anti-social. Only those people classified as anti-social were more risk averse for
others, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. When the uncertainty was removed,
however, all participants exhibited less anti-social behavior. Together, these results suggest that anti-social motives contribute
to the observed limited risk taking for others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of these motives.
Keywords: decisions from experience, uncertainty, decision making for others, social interaction, anti-social behavior
1 Introduction
Many risky decisions that people make affect other people,
which can effectively spread, share, or even oﬄoad the risk.
Some situations are more obviously social, such as when a
financial advisor invests a portfolio for a client, but others
are less so, such as when people make career decisions that
affect themselves, their families, and their friends. Though
most studies of risky choice are devoid of an explicit social
context (e.g., Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Holt & Laury, 2002),
several studies have examined risk taking for others. Find-
ings in this literature are mixed: Some studies have found
that people tend to be more risk averse for others than them-
selves (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Reynold, Joseph &
Sherwood, 2009), a result often attributed to a sense of re-
sponsibility (Charness & Jackson, 2009). In contrast, other
studies have found that people tend to be more risk seek-
ing for others than themselves (e.g., Chakravarty, Harrison,
Haruvy & Rutström 2011; Pollmann, Potters & Trautmann,
2014; Stone & Allgaier, 2008), a result sometimes attributed
to a social norm of risk taking that is heeded more in choices
for others than for oneself.
Irrespective of the direction of change in risk taking, the
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differences in choices for self and others are usually at-
tributed to prosocial attitudes, assuming that people choose
what they think would be best for the other person. This
supposed ubiquitous prosociality conforms with the hyper-
altruism observed when people are faced with causing harm
to others (Crockett et al., 2014; Perera et al., 2016), but
conflicts with findings that people also have a competitive
streak, such as when people are happier when their income
exceeds that of those around them (e.g., Clark & Oswald,
1996) or even an anti-social streak, such as when they do
not contribute to a public good even though it is in their
self-interest to do so (Brandts, Saijo & Schram, 2004; Saijo,
2008). This occasional anti-social behavior in social com-
parison suggests that differences in risk taking for self and
other could also be due to anti-social motives. For example,
people might choose the better of two lotteries (in terms of
their expected utility) for themselves and the worse for an-
other person. This pattern could then lead to more or less
risk taking for others, depending on the exact characteris-
tics of those lotteries. Here, in two pre-registered experi-
ments, we examine how decision making for others differs in
an experience-based learning environment and test whether
pro- or anti-social motives are connected to any observed
differences.
People have strong social preferences about how to equi-
tably distribute outcomes to others (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999),
whichmight also affect their risk taking for others. These so-
cial preferences, however, have mostly been tested under cer-
tainty. For example, in the dictator game, where participants
decide how to distribute money between themselves and a
second person, non-zero outcomes for others are typically se-
lected (Engel, 2011; Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986).
To disentangle the different potential motives in these social
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games, a collection of dictator games with a fixed choice set
has been developed into the social-value-orientation (SVO)
scale (e.g., Liebrand, 1984; Murphy, Ackerman & Hand-
graaf, 2011). Based on the choices made, this scale provides
both a quantitative estimate of prosociality (the SVO angle,
described later) as well as a discrete classification of peo-
ple into competitive, selfish, prosocial, or altruistic groups
based on this quantitative score. According to this measure,
around 12% of people express competitive behavior, which
can be considered as anti-social, whereas 46% behave in
accordance with prosocial motives (Au & Kwong, 2004).
These behavioral results have led to models of social pref-
erence which assume that people value equity in outcomes
(e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; but
see Charness & Rabin, 2002).
Whereas laboratory studies often find prosocial tenden-
cies and inequity aversion, field studies find that happiness
increases with an increase in relative income rank compared
to others in one’s respective peer group (e.g., Brown, Gard-
ner, Oswald & Qian, 2008; Clark & Oswald, 1996; Tide-
man, Frijters & Shields, 2008). One potential interpretation
of this finding is that people gain utility from having more
than someone else, which resembles competitive behavior
in the SVO classification. Consequently, there might be an
inherent tension between people’s pro- and anti-social ten-
dencies, and the expression of these tendencies might at least
depend partly on the environment. One apparent difference
between the laboratory experiments and real-world surveys
is the degree of ambiguity in the link between choice and
outcome: Ambiguity is typically absent in the former set-
ting, but present in the latter. Simply introducing risk with
pre-defined probabilities of rewards into the dictator game
affects social preferences: People do still share chance out-
comes with others, but to a lesser extent (Brock, Lange &
Ozbay, 2013; Krawczyk & Le Lec, 2010). Moreover, across
individuals, there is no correlation between social prefer-
ences under certainty and risk (Bolton, Ockenfels & Stauf,
2015; Bradler, 2009). Given this anti-social streak, espe-
cially under uncertainty, it is potentially problematic that
predominantly prosocial tendencies have been invoked to
explain differences in risky decisions for self and others.
Almost all previous studies examining risky choice for
others have used decisions from description, where the odds
and outcomes are explicitly presented (e.g., Bolton & Ock-
enfels, 2010; Charness & Jackson, 2009; Raynold, Joseph &
Sherwood, 2009). In contrast, in real life, the odds and out-
comes are often not known when people make decisions for
themselves or for other people. In this study, we developed a
decisions-from-experience (DfE) design where people have
no prior knowledge of the odds or outcomes, but can only
learn them by sampling from the different options. This
procedure makes the odds and outcomes more ambiguous
compared to decisions with explicitly described risks and
thus might affect the expression of social preferences. In
decision making without a social context, the same odds
and outcomes can lead to different behavior when presented
either in a described or experience-based format (Hertwig,
Weber, Barron & Erev, 2004). For example, rare events are
weighted differently in experience compared to description
(Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco & Hertwig, 2018; Glöckner,
Hilbig, Henninger & Fiedler, 2016; Kellen, Pachur & Her-
twig, 2016) and extreme outcomes gain more importance
in experience (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Ludvig, Madan
& Spetch, 2014, Madan, Ludvig & Spetch, 2017). Given
these dissimilarities in individual risky choice, how social
preferences under certainty and risk will generalize to an
experience-based protocol is not clear.
In this paper, we present two experiments that examine
how social preferences interact with outcome uncertainty,
using a DfE design. The first experiment focuses on the
following pre-registered question: How do risk preferences
change in choices for others compared to oneself? Post-hoc,
we classified people according to their social preferences
and examined which motives correspond with risk taking for
others. Furthermore, we compared social preferences in the
DfE task with those under certainty. Then, in a second pre-
registered experiment, using different rewarding outcomes,
we replicate the core results and confirm the post-hoc find-
ings from the first experiment.
2 Experiment 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Sixty-two participants were recruited in 4 sessions of 10–20
participants from the University of Warwick paid participant
pool via the Sona system — an online system for managing
experimental participants (https://www.sona-systems.com/).
The Warwick participant pool is run jointly by Psychology,
Economics, and the Business School, and consists of both
students (mostly) and staff from all disciplines as well as
former students and members of the local community. The
number of participants was determined prior to the exper-
iment through a power analysis with 80% power to find a
medium effect size (d = 0.5) at the 5% significance level
with a two-sided, two-sample t test. Four participants were
excluded, who could either not be matched to another par-
ticipant in an individual session or failed at the catch trials,
leaving 58 participants (Mage = 21.4, SDage = 3.1; 42 female,
16 male). We did not collect other demographic details from
the participants. Participants were paid a show-up fee of
£4 plus a variable bonus depending on their own choices
or the choices of a matched partner (ranging from £0.50 to
£8.00, M = £4.82). All procedural details, including hy-
potheses, recruited participant numbers, exclusion criteria,
and planned analyses were preregistered at the Open Science
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Framework: https://osf.io/2bts4. Code for experiments and
analysis as well as the raw data are available at the same link.
2.1.2 Procedure and Materials
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants received an in-
formation sheet and then provided written informed consent
to participate in the experiment. The experiment was per-
formed at a computer and consisted of six blocks of trials.
There were 3 sampling and 3 choice blocks, with each sam-
pling block followed by a choice block. The experiment was
programmed with PsychoPy 1.84 (Peirce, 2007). Instruc-
tions were provided on the computer screen and could be
read at the participant’s own pace; questions could also be
asked of the experimenter. The instructions described the
task and framed it as a group decision-making experiment in
which participants could choose between monetary lotteries
for themselves and for another randomly selected participant
in the room. The instructions stressed that the choices for
oneself and the other person were separate from each other.
In the sampling blocks, participants distributed 40 sam-
ples among 8 decks of cards in whatever order or quantity
they wished. Each deck had a unique symbol that was the
same for a given distribution throughout the experiment (see
Figure 1). The connections between the symbols and the
underlying distributions were randomized for each partici-
pant. All distributions were continuous and uniform. There
were 2 low-value decks (mean = £2.5), 4 medium-value
decks (mean = £4.5), and 2 high-value decks (mean = £6.5).
Draws from the decks were randomly distributed around
these means. Half the decks for each mean value had a small
range (i.e., lower variance, range of ±0.5), and the other half
had a medium range (i.e., medium variance, range of ±2);
decks with an even larger range of ±3.5 were used only in
Study 2. In the choice blocks (see below), all the high-value
and low-value decks appeared in the choices for both self
and other. The 4 medium decks, however, were split such
that 2 decks (one small and one medium range) appeared
only in self choices, and the other 2 decks only appeared in
choices for the other. This split aimed to examine whether
people sample differently once they find out that some decks
are relevant only in choices for themselves and some only
in choices for other participants (see the Supplement for an
analysis of sampling behavior, which did not provide evi-
dence for this conjecture). Participants could learn about the
range of possible outcomes only from experience and were
told neither the means nor the ranges of the different decks.
Figure 1A shows a schematic of how, during the sam-
pling blocks, the screen displayed all 8 decks as well as a
decreasing count of the number of samples remaining. The
8 decks always appeared in the same locations during sam-
pling, providing an additional memory cue for the symbol.
Participants sampled from a given deck by left-clicking on
it with the mouse. The symbol for the selected deck then
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Figure 1: Screenshot from (A) the sampling block and (B)
the choice block. Each square represents a deck of cards,
and the symbols indicated the underlying distribution for a
draw from that deck. The distributions could only be learned
by sampling from each of the decks.
disappeared and, at its former position, a random draw from
the corresponding distribution (see above) rounded to two
digits (e.g., £2.36) appeared for 0.5 s. After that, the sym-
bol for the given deck reappeared. While the outcome was
displayed, no sampling was possible. Once participants had
no samples left, they clicked on continue, and a choice block
followed.
In the choice blocks, participants made 21 pairs of bi-
nary choices between the decks. On each of the 21 trials,
participants made two choices: They chose between two of
the decks for themselves and between two (possibly differ-
ent) decks for a second participant. Figure 1B shows how the
screenwas divided down themiddle by a line, with two decks
of cards vertically positioned on each side (for a total of 4
decks). One side, indicated by the word “self”, displayed the
two decks to choose between for oneself, and the other side,
indicated by the word “other”, displayed the two decks to
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choose between for the other participant. The self/other lo-
cation was counterbalanced across participants, but constant
across trials for each participant.
Participants made choices by clicking on their preferred
deck with the mouse. After a mouse-click on a deck, the
deck’s borders switched to green, indicating the deck had
been clicked. Once a selection had been made both for self
and other, the participant confirmed these choices by clicking
on a continue button or by pressing “enter” on the keyboard.
Selections could be changed until they were confirmed. No
additional feedback was provided during the choice blocks,
so participants had to rely on what they had learned during
the sampling blocks to guide their choices.
Table 1 shows the 21 choice situations, each consisting
of a choice between 2 decks for the decision maker and a
choice between 2 decks for the other participant. Choices
were presented in an order randomized for each participant
and presented once in each block. Each of the situations was
selected to test a particular hypothesis about how risk and in-
equity influence decisionmaking in this social situation. The
first 5 choices in the table examined risk attitude for self and
other, comparing risk preference for identical choices, with
a risk-return trade-off in choices 4 and 5. The next 6 choices
examined whether the rewards potentially available to the
other participant (higher or lower) influence risky choice
(and vice versa). The next 6 choices examined inequity aver-
sion (both advantageous and disadvantageous) by offering
different potential reward levels for self and other. The next
2 choices were used as comparison to the inequity-aversion
choices without differences in the choice menu between self
and other. The final two choices served as catch trials, with
an obvious dominant alternative, and, post-hoc, as a means
of classifying participants as pro- or anti-social based on
how they chose for the other participant.
In anticipation of Experiment 2, we define dominant
choice situations as ones where one option has a higher EV
and the same or smaller range than the other option andwhere
the choice sets were the same for self and other. Choices 18
and 19 also have this characteristic; however, because they
were used as comparisons for the inequity-aversion analy-
sis (see the Supplement), they were not included in the pri-
mary classification. We revisit these trials in later robustness
checks.
As the task was self-paced, at the end of the experiment,
some participants had to wait for the other participants to
finish. Once all participants finished, participants were
matched in groups of two, and one participant from each
pair was randomly determined to be the decision maker for
that pair. One trial was randomly selected, and the distribu-
tions selected by the decision maker were played out for the
decision maker and the other group member separately. The
outcomes of these draws determined the variable payoffs for
the two group members, respectively. Participants saw their
own outcome on the computer screen and learned whether
Table 1: Choice situations in Experiment 1. % Self-B is the
percentage of trials where option B was chosen for oneself.
% Oth.-B is the percentage of trials where option B was cho-
sen for the other person.
Self-A Self-B Other-A Other-B % Self-B % Oth.-B
Risk Attitude
1 4.5L 4.5M 4.5L 4.5M 51 50
2 2.5L 2.5M 2.5L 2.5M 47 52
3 6.5L 6.5M 6.5L 6.5M 52 52
4 2.5L 4.5M 2.5L 4.5M 80 49
5 4.5L 6.5M 4.5L 6.5M 90 49
Social Aspiration level
6 4.5L 4.5M 6.5L 6.5M 53 52
7 2.5L 2.5M 4.5L 4.5M 41 48
8 2.5L 2.5M 6.5L 6.5M 43 55
9 4.5L 4.5M 2.5L 2.5M 54 45
10 6.5L 6.5M 4.5L 4.5M 51 44
11 6.5L 6.5M 2.5L 2.5M 53 44
Inequity Aversion
12 4.5L 4.5M 4.5L 6.5L 55 48
13 4.5L 4.5M 4.5M 6.5M 51 50
14 2.5M 4.5L 4.5L 6.5M 80 45
15 4.5L 6.5L 4.5L 4.5M 88 45
16 4.5M 6.5M 4.5L 4.5M 83 47
17 4.5L 6.5M 2.5M 4.5L 87 43
Comparison – No Inequity Aversion
18 4.5L 6.5L 4.5L 6.5L 91 51
19 4.5M 6.5M 4.5M 6.5M 91 56
Catch Trials & Classification
20 2.5L 6.5L 2.5L 6.5L 96 49
21 2.5M 6.5M 2.5M 6.5M 94 51
Note. The first number of each option is the expected value,
and the letter symbolizes outcome ranges: L = ± 0.5, M =
± 2.0. H for high is reserved for stimuli in Experiment 2.
their own decision has been implemented or whether their
outcome was determined by the other participant. Nobody,
however, knew with whom they had been paired. Payment
was given individually at the end of the experiment.
While participants waited for the payment and before they
saw their experimental gains, they filled out the paper-and-
pencil 6-item version of the SVO-Slider (Murphy, Ackerman
& Handgraaf, 2011). This task consists of 6 mini-dictator
games. In each game, participants chose how to distribute
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money for themselves and someone else from 9 different
distributions; these distributions varied across the 6 games.
The different available distributions systematically varied the
possible choice sets, thus allowing us to distinguish different
motives, such as maximizing own outcome or maximizing
social outcome. These choices were not incentivized. For
each participant, an SVO angle was computed based on the
choices made (see Murphy et al., 2011, for a graphical de-
piction of the logic behind these calculations). This angle
is calculated as the inverse tangent of the ratio between the
mean allocation for the other person and for oneself (sub-
tracted by 50 monetary units each). Larger angles mean a
higher degree of prosocial attitudes. Zero degrees signifies a
perfectly selfish individual who maximizes their own alloca-
tion and otherwise chooses a random allocation for the other
person. The computed angles are divided into a discrete
classification system that bunches people into four groups
from low to high prosociality: Competitive (SVO angle be-
low −12.04°) means people gain utility from having a high
difference in outcomes between oneself and someone else.
Selfish (SVO angle between −12.04° and 22.45°) means that
people gain utility only from their own outcomes and do not
care about the outcome of others. Prosocial (SVO angle
between 22.45° and 57.17°) means that people gain utility
from their own and from someone else’s outcome or by min-
imizing the distance between their own and someone else’s
outcome. Finally, altruistic (SVOangle above 57.17°)means
that people only gain utility from outcomes for others.
All data analyses were conducted in RStudio 0.99 (R
studio team, 2015) based on R 3.3.0 (R core team,
2016). Regressions were performed with the packages lme4
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 2015) and lmerTest
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff & Christensen, 2017). Regressions
had subject random intercepts and used the logit link func-
tion with interaction and main effects as reported in the text.
Effect sizes were calculated as Cohen’s d from the choice
proportion differences, and mean differences are presented
with 95% confidence intervals. In general, the data analyses
followed the pre-registered plan. Any deviations from this
pre-registered analysis plan are clearly marked in the Results
section.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Risky Choices
First, we examined how risky choices differed when partic-
ipants chose for themselves or another participant from the
same choice set. Figure 2A shows the percentage of risky
choices aggregated over all trials and all participants for
choice situations 1–5 (left), 1–3 (middle), and 4–5 (right).
For choices 1–5 (see Table 1), there was one smaller and one
larger range option. Participants chose the larger range op-
tion 13.3 ± 6.5 percentage points (Mean ± 95% confidence
interval) more often for themselves than for someone else.
A Wilcoxon test confirmed a significant difference between
choices for self and other (W(n = 58) = 1178.5, d = 0.52, p <
.001).1 Follow-up exploratory analyses showed that this ef-
fect, however, was entirely due to choices 4–5, which differed
from choices 1–3 in that there was a risk-return trade-off be-
tween a small-range, low-expected-value (EV) option and a
large-range, high-EV option. Here, people chose the safer
option 35.3 ± 9.3% more often for others than themselves
(W(n = 58) = 836, d = 0.94, p < .001). There was little
difference, however, between choices for self and other in
choices 1–3 (−1.3 ± 6.9%), where the expected value was
the same for both options (W(n = 58) = 579, d = 0.05, p >
.250). These results were confirmed by a logistic regression
with random subject effects showing that there was a signif-
icant interaction between the choice type (1–3 vs. 4–5) and
choices for self and other (b = 1.83, SE = 0.22, p < .001).
Further exploratory analyses revealed that there was a
strongly bimodal distribution of choice proportions when
deciding for others in choices 20 and 21. These situations
consist of options with one low-EV and one high-EV option
with equal range for both self and other. Thus, one option
dominated the other. In choices for oneself, these situations
were used as catch trials. In choices for others, these situ-
ations were used to classify participants. People used two
clearly distinct strategies in choices for others: Figure 2C
shows how 25 participants chose the higher-EV option for
the other participants 5 or 6 out of 6 times they encountered
the choice situation (green in figure), whereas 26 participants
chose the higher-EV option 0 or 1 out of 6 times (yellow).
In line with the literature about distributional choices, we
term these two choice patterns as prosocial, where people
either try to maximize the outcome for the other participant
or minimize the difference between outcomes (as they chose
the higher-EV option for themselves most of the time), and
anti-social, where people try to minimize the outcome for
the other participant or maximize the difference between
outcomes.
Figure 2B shows that participants classified as anti-social
chose the risky option 60.9 ± 13.3% more often for them-
selves than for others in choice situations (Choices 4–5)
involving a risk-return trade-off (W(n = 26) = 323.5, d =
1.76, p < .001), as compared to prosocials, who only did
so 6.7 ± 7.5% more often (W(n = 25) = 42.5, d = 0.35,
p = .134). Anti-social participants consistently chose the
lower-EV option for the other participant. This pattern was
corroborated by amixed-effects logistic regressionwhere the
interaction between choosing for oneself or other and being
classified as either anti-social or prosocial was significant in
the risk-return trade-off choices 4–5 (b = 2.49, SE = 0.45,
1The pre-registration indicated that paired t tests would be used, but
the choice proportions were not normally distributed, so Wilcoxon tests
were used instead. Sticking with the t tests yields the same qualitative
conclusions.
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Figure 2: (A) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of risky choices
for all risk-attitude choice situations and then separately for
those with the same expected value (1–3) and those with a
risk-return trade-off (4–5). Grey dots are choice percentages
for individual participants using horizontal jitter. (B) Mean
percentage (± 95% CI) of risky choices for choice with a
risk-return trade-off (4–5), split by participant classification
as prosocial or anti-social. (C) Percentage of risky choices
for others in the risk-return trade-off choices (4–5) correlated
with the percentage of dominant choice for other in classifi-
cation trials (20–21), where colors illustrate the classification
scheme applied and vertical and horizontal jitter was applied
to make all points visible. *** = p < .001.
p < .001). Moreover, Figure 2C plots risky choice in risk-
return trade-off choices 4–5 against the choices in situations
20–21: There was a strong correlation between the number
of higher-EV choices for others in the classification trials
and the number of risky choices for others in the risk-return
trade-off choices (r(56) = 0.83, p < .001).
2.2.2 Classification Results Compared to the SVO
Questionnaire
Using the standard classification borders, the SVO slider
questionnaire classified 25 people as prosocial, 33 as selfish,
and 0 as competitive or altruistic. For the choice task, SVO
prosocials would be expected to choose the higher-EV option
for others consistently, because they benefit fromminimizing
the difference between themselves and another participant or
because they want to maximize joint welfare. Those classi-
fied as selfish by the SVOshould be indifferentwith respect to
the other participant’s outcome. Thus, they should respond
at a chance level with respect to choices for others with dif-
ferent expected values. In contrast, in the classification trials
20–21, 26 participants consistently chose the lower-EV op-
tion for the other participant— a strongly anti-social pattern,
which may arise out of competitive motives. Yet, none of
these 26 participants were classified as competitive by the
SVO. To see whether the classifications of the experience-
based task and the SVO are homogenous, we conducted a
Stuart-Maxwell test on the joint frequency table. This test
rejects homogeneity of the two classifications (χ2(2) = 17,
p < .001). We thus conclude that the classification based
on the SVO differs from the classification according to the
main experience-based task. In particular, as is apparent in
Figure 3A, the SVO did not classify the same number of
people as anti-social or competitive compared to the main
classification task.
Using the continuous scale of the SVO slider (Figure 3),
where higher values indicate more prosocial behavior, there
was a slight, but not statistically significant, positive cor-
relation between angle and percentage of high-EV choices
for the other participant in the choice task (r(56) = .23, p
= .077). The correlation of the SVO angle with choosing
the risky (and high-EV) option for other was numerically
somewhat smaller in the risk-return trade-off choices (r(56)
= .15, p > .250).
2.2.3 Robustness
As a robustness check, we assessed a different classification
criterion, using choices 18 and 19 (instead of 20 and 21;
see Table 1), where there was also a dominant option. With
this alternate classification, 19 participants were classified
as anti-social (of whom one was not classified as anti-social
originally and 8 previously classified as anti-social are ab-
sent) and 24 as prosocial (of whom one was not classified as
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Figure 3: (A) Comparison of classification of prosocial be-
havior in the decision-from-experience task (choices 20 & 21)
and the SVOQuestionnaire (mini-dictator games). (B) Corre-
lation between risky choice for others in the risk-return trade-
off choices (4 & 5) and the SVO Questionnaire. In both fig-
ures the colors signify classification based on the decision-
from-experience task, and vertical jitter was used to ensure
visibility of all datapoints.
prosocial originally and two previously classified as proso-
cial are absent). As before, the anti-social participants chose
the risky option 68.4 ±14.3%more often for themselves than
others when there was a risk return trade-off in choices 4–5
(W(n = 19) = 171, d=2.15, p <.001), whereas prosocials only
did so 4.9 ±7.0% of the time (W(n = 24) = 32.5, d = 0.28, p >
.250). A logistic regression confirmed a significant interac-
tion between choosing for self and other and being classified
anti-social or prosocial according to choices 18 and 19 in
risk-return trade-off choices: b = 3.08, SE = 0.51, p < .001.
Furthermore, we checked for robustness of our analyses
with respect to sampling errors. To do so, we compared
the sampled mean and range with the theoretical mean and
range of the respective choice options. After the first round
of sampling, in none of the 348 relevant comparisons (risk-
return trade-off choices 4 & 5 and classification choices 20
& 21) did the lower-EV option have a higher experienced
EV, and in only 5 comparisons, was the higher-EV option
better by less than £0.5 (compared to a £2 difference in the
generative distributions). In only 7 out of 464 relevant com-
parisons (risky choices 1–5), the smaller-range option had
the higher experienced range, and in only 18 comparisons,
the difference between experienced ranges was less than ¼
of the theoretical range difference after the first round of
sampling. The number of deviations between experienced
and planned distributions was even lower after the second
and third round of sampling.
To see whether these few trials affected our results, we
excluded choices in all rounds where the previously experi-
enced means or ranges were much closer to each other than
planned (given the criteria above) after the first round of sam-
pling. This exclusion removed 63 out of 1218, or roughly 5%
of the relevant choices (risky choices 1–5 and classification
20 & 21). All the Wilcoxon tests performed above yielded
qualitatively similar results after these exclusions.
In the pre-registration, we also asked questions about how
the rewards of others influence risk preference (Choices 6–
11), inequity aversion (Choices 12–19), and the sampling
process. These analyses are included in the Supplement for
completeness.
3 Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, people were more risk averse when de-
ciding for others than for themselves in an experience-based
task. Exploratory analyses showed that this effectwas related
to anti-social motives: Some of the participants consistently
chose lower-EV options for others in risk-return trade-off
situations. In addition, classification of participants based
on the experience-based task was a much better predictor of
anti-social behavior in risk-return trade-off choices than was
classification based on the SVO slider task.
We pre-registered a second study to confirm the ex-
ploratory result by increasing the number of gambles used to
examine risky choice and classify participants (see Table 2).
In addition, wewanted to address two further open questions:
First, participants were risk neutral in choices that differed
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Table 2: Choice situations in Experiment 2. % Self-B is the
percentage of trials where option B was chosen for oneself.
% Oth.-B is the percentage of trials where option B was cho-
sen for the other person.
Self-A Self-B Other-A Other-B % Self-B % Oth.-B
Risk Attitude
1 4L 4M 4L 4M 40 42
2 4M 4H 4M 4H 47 45
3 4L 4H 4L 4H 37 39
4 6L 6M 6L 6M 44 50
5 6M 6H 6M 6H 54 52
6 6L 6H 6L 6H 54 49
7 4L 6M 4L 6M 84 62
8 4M 6H 4M 6H 89 62
9 4L 6H 4L 6H 87 65
Inequity Aversion
10 4L 6L 4L 4M 79 35
11 4M 6M 4M 4H 78 44
12 4H 6H 4M 4H 81 49
13 4L 4M 4L 6L 38 64
14 4M 4H 4M 6M 44 52
15 4M 4H 4H 6H 51 56
Comparison – No Inequity Aversion
16 4L 6L 4L 6L 82 65
17 4M 6M 4M 6M 88 68
18 4H 6H 4H 6H 85 67
Catch Trials & Classification
19 4H 6L 4H 6L 85 66
20 4M 6L 4M 6L 86 66
21 4H 6M 4H 6M 88 69
Note. The first number of each option is the mean value,
and the letter symbolizes the range: L = ±0.5, M = ±2, H
= ±3.5.
only in range. This pattern could reflect a genuine prefer-
ence, but could also reflect a lack of learning about range
differences between the decks. Therefore, we increased the
range differences, reduced the number of decks, and explic-
itly asked participants about the ranges of outcomes. Second,
we aimed to confirm the result that high levels of anti-social
behavior were specific to choices under uncertainty. There-
fore, we used a computerized version of the SVO and an extra
one-shot choice under certainty, both fully incentivized, so
as to be more comparable to the main task.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Sixty-nine participants were recruited in 7 sessions of 4–12
participants from the same participant pool as Experiment 1.
The number of participants was estimated prior to the exper-
iment with a power analysis, as in the first experiment. Two
participants were excluded who either could not be matched
to a partner or failed the exclusion criterion (i.e., sampled
one option fewer then 5 times), which left 67 participants
(Mage = 23.6, SDage = 3.1; 40 female, 27 male). Partici-
pants were paid a show-up fee of £4 plus a variable bonus
depending on their own choices or the choices of a matched
partner (ranging from £1.50 to £8.59,M = £4.71). Again, all
methods and analyses were pre-registered and can be found
together with all other material at https://osf.io/2bts4.
3.1.2 Procedure
The procedure was largely the same as in Experiment 1,
with some changes in the reward distributions and the choice
situations (see Table 2). In particular, the number of distri-
butions (decks) was reduced from 8 to 6, a third range level
was introduced, and only 2 mean values were used. The
uniform distributions had a mean value of either 4 or 6 and
a range of either ±0.5 (low), ±2 (medium), or ±3.5 (high).
Table 2 shows the revised choice situations, which were se-
lected to best follow up the results from the first study. There
were 9 choice situations assessing risk attitude, of which 3
contained a risk-return trade-off. Furthermore, as in the first
experiment, 9 choice situations assessed inequity aversion
and 3 additional situations were used for classifying partici-
pants and as a manipulation check. The number of samples
in each sampling block was changed slightly to boost learn-
ing about the 6 decks during the first block. Specifically,
people sampled 80 times in the first block and only 30 times
in each of the second and third sampling blocks. Again,
participants could distribute these samples in any order they
wanted among the 6 available decks.
After the final choice block, there was an additional choice
between two certain options (a certain £4 vs. a certain £6)
both for oneself and for another participant. After that ques-
tion, the computerized version of the SVO slider (6 items)
was presented. Finally, 4 additional questions assessing par-
ticipants’ knowledge about the ranges of the decks were pre-
sented. For each EV level, two questions were asked: First,
all three decks with the same EV were presented, and par-
ticipants were asked which deck was the riskiest. Second,
all three decks were again presented, and participants were
asked which deck was the safest. The same two questions
were then repeated with the other three decks with the other
EV. The payment mechanism was the same as in the first
experiment, with the difference that a payoff-relevant trial
could also be chosen from the SVO choices or from the
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choice under certainty. Thus, all choices were incentivized,
but the questions about the decks’ ranges were not.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Risky Choices
With more risky-choice situations (1–9 in Table 2), the pat-
tern from Experiment 1 was confirmed. Figure 4A shows
how, overall, people chose the risky option 8.0 ± 4.0% more
often for themselves than for others (W(n=67) = 709, d
= 0.48, p < .001). This difference was again driven by
choices with a risk-return trade-off (7–9), where people
chose the risky option 23.7 ± 7.9% more often for them-
selves (W(n=67) = 780.5, d = 0.72, p < .001), as opposed
to those with equal expected value (1–6), where people only
chose the risky option 0.2 ± 4.2% more often for themselves
(W(n=67) = 2202, d = 0.01, p > .250). This interaction in the
percentage of risky choices for oneself and others in trade-off
choices (7–9) as compared to choices with the same EV (1–
6) was confirmed through a mixed-effects logistic regression
(b = 1.37, SE = 0.17, p < .001).
As pre-registered, situations where one option dominated
the other in terms of EV and range (19–21 in Table 2) were
used as a measure of other-regarding preferences to classify
the participants. Participants were classified as anti-social
if they chose the dominating option for the other participant
up to 2 out of 9 trials (13 participants) and as prosocial if
they chose it at least 7 times (35 participants). These criteria
left 19 participants unclassified (see Figure 4C). Figure 4B
shows that those classified as anti-social chose the safe option
70.1 ± 12.9% more often for others than for themselves in
the risk-return trade-off choice situations (W(n=13) = 169,
d = 2.95, p < .001), whereas those classified as prosocial
did so only 5.1 ± 5.7% more often (W(n=35) = 685, d =
0.30, p = .108), yielding a significant interaction in a mixed-
effects logistic regression (b = 3.35, SE = 0.48, p < .001).
Thus, the main results of the first study were confirmed in
this replication with different choice situations. In addition,
in choices with the same EV where only the range differed,
people trended toward expressing slight risk aversion; that is,
they chose the larger range option slightly less than 50% of
the time for themselves and others (Self: W(n=67) = 670.5,
d = 0.23, p = .048; Other: W(n=67) = 745.5, d = 0.25, p =
.071)
3.2.2 Classification Results
Because the SVO questionnaire in the first study did not cap-
ture the observed anti-social behavior in risk-return trade-off
trials, we implemented a computerized and incentivized ver-
sion of the SVO in Experiment 2. Nonetheless, classification
results in the SVO were comparable to Experiment 1: 22
prosocial, 44 selfish, and 1 competitive. The classifications
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Figure 4: (A) Mean percentage (± 95% CI) of risky choices
for self and other in all choice situations with different ranges
(choice situations 1–9, left) and separately for those with the
same expected value (1–6, middle) and those with a risk-
return trade-off (7–9, right). Grey points represent individ-
ual participants with horizontal jitter. (B) Mean percentage
(± 95% CI) of risky choices for self and other with a risk-
return trade-off (7–9), split by participant classification. (C)
Percentage of risky choices for others in the risk-return trade-
off choices (7–9) correlated with the percentage of dominant
choice for other in classification trials (19–21), where colors
illustrate the classification scheme applied and both vertical
and horizontal jitter were used. *** = p < .001.
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Figure 5: (A) Comparison of the two methods for classi-
fication of prosocial individuals in Exp 2 — choices with a
dominant option for others in the main DfE task (i.e., choices
19–21) and the SVOQuestionnaire (dictator games). (B) Cor-
relation between choosing riskily for others in the risk-return
trade-off choices (Choices 7–9 in the DfE task) and classifi-
cation from the SVOQuestionnaire. In both figures the colors
signify classification based on the decision-from-experience
task and vertical jitter was used. ** p < .01.
from the SVO and the experience-based task differed signif-
icantly from one another, as confirmed by a Stuart-Maxwell
test (χ2(2) = 19.94, p < .001). Using the continuous scale
of the SVO slider (Figure 5), however, where higher values
signify more prosocial behavior, there was a significant pos-
itive correlation between the SVO angle and percentage of
high-EV choices for the other participant (r (65) = .32, p =
.008). Furthermore, there was a significant correlation be-
tween the SVO angle and the choice of risky (and high-EV)
options for others in the risk-return trade-off choices (r(65)
= .32, p = .007). This pattern indicates that the SVO does
not predict the amount of anti-social behavior present in the
decisions-from-experience task, but does capture part of the
individual differences in this task.
In the two-choice distribution task under certainty, where
people decided between taking either a certain £4 or £6 for
themselves and then again for the other person, 17 of 67
participants chose the lower outcome for the other person.
Thus, anti-social behavior was more pronounced here than
in the SVO, where there were trade-offs between one’s own
and another person’s outcome.
3.2.3 Robustness
Above, as pre-registered, we classified individuals on the
basis of a subset of trials where there were dominant (higher
mean; equal or smaller range) options for others (Choices
19–21 in Table 2). As in Experiment 1, by this definition,
there were additional choices with a dominant option, which
served as a comparison for any potential inequity aversion
(see supplemental material). As a robustness check, we
re-did our analyses with these trials to classify participants.
With these trials, 10 participantswere classified as anti-social
(of whom 2 were not classified as anti-social according to
the original classification trials and 5 previously classified
as anti-social are absent) and 36 as prosocial (of whom 5
were not classified as prosocial according to the original
classification trials and 4 previously classified as prosocial
are absent). On the risk-return trade-off choices (7–9), the
anti-social individuals chose the risky (higher EV) option
72.2 ±17.9% more often for themselves than others (W(n =
10) = 100, d = 2.51, p < .001), whereas prosocials did so only
4.6 ±4.1% more often (W(n = 36) = 743, d = 0.37, p > .250.
A logistic regression confirmed this significant interaction
between risk preference for self and other and being classified
as antisocial or prosocial according to Choices 16–18: b =
3.53, SE = 0.53, p < .001.
As in Experiment 1, we also checked for robustness of the
analyses with respect to sampling errors. To do so, we exam-
ined how the experienced outcomes matched the generative
distributions. After the first round of sampling, the lower
EV option had the higher experienced EV in only 3 of 402
relevant comparisons (risk-return trade-off choices 7–9 and
classification choices 19–21). In addition, this difference
was smaller than £0.50 in only 5 additional comparisons
(compared to the planned £2). In terms of the range, in the
804 relevant comparisons (risky choices 1–9 and classifica-
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of people based on the number of cor-
rect answers given for the range questions (4 total questions
with three answer options for each).
tion choices 19–21), the smaller-range option had the higher
experienced range 10 times and the difference in ranges was
smaller than ¼ of the planned difference 28 additional times
after the first round of sampling. The numbers of such sam-
pling errors were even lower after the second and third round
of sampling. Excluding all these trials led to the exclusion of
90 out of 2412 choices, or 4% of the relevant choices, and the
qualitative results for all statistical tests remained identical.
To check whether participants learned about the differ-
ent levels of outcome ranges associated with the decks, we
asked people to name the safest or riskiest out of each set of
three decks with the same EV. There were 4 questions with
3 potential answers, thus the guessing rate was 1.33 correct
answers. Figure 6 plots the frequencies of correct answers
for all participants: 53 participants were above the guessing
rate, and the average score was significantly better than this
guessing rate (M = 2.1 ± 0.2). There was no reliable cor-
relation between the number of correct range answers and
the likelihood of choosing the high-EV option for others in
the classification trials, r(65) = -0.11, p > .250. In addition,
anti-social and prosocial participants did not reliably dif-
fer in the number of correct answers to the range questions
(MAntisocial = 2.31 and MProsocial = 2.03, t(18.99) = 0.80, p >
.25, corrected for heterogeneity of variance).
To see whether the key effects were driven by participants
who could not distinguish between the different levels of
range, we excluded participantswhowere below the guessing
rate of 1.33 (14 participants with 0 or 1 correct answers
excluded). There was still a significant difference between
self and other for all risky choices 1–9 of 7.6 ± 4.3% (W(n =
53) = 454, d = 0.49 p < .001). Furthermore, there was also a
significant difference in the risk-return trade-off choices 7–9:
24.5 ±8.8% (W(n = 53) = 514, d = 0.75, p < .001).
The pre-registered analyses concerning inequity aversion
(choices 10–18) and the analyses of the sampling process are
again included in the Supplement for completeness.
4 General Discussion
Across two experiments, people were more risk averse for
others, largely due to a subset of participants who showed
reward-maximizing behavior for themselves, but not for oth-
ers. This anti-social behavior emerged only when there was
uncertainty around the actual outcomes, but not in the social-
value-orientation (SVO) questionnaire where decisions were
made between certain outcomes. This study represents one
of the first examinations of risky choice for others in a task
that uses decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004),
building on prior work that used explicit descriptions of the
risky outcomes (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Chakravarty et
al. 2011; Pollmann et al., 2014; Raynold et al., 2009). The
results suggest that prior interpretations of differences in
risky choices for self and other as an expression of prosocial
motives (e.g., Charness & Jackson, 2009) may need to be
reconsidered.
The anti-social behavior amongst a significant subset of
the participants seems to be enabled by the outcome uncer-
tainty in the experience-based task, which is not present with
the SVO slider, where outcomes are certain. With uncertain
outcomes, EV-minimizing choices for others might feel less
severe because the consequences have not yet materialized.
Similarly, people are known to give less in dictator games if
the relation between one’s own choice and the outcome for
the other person is uncertain or not transparent (Dana, We-
ber and Kuang, 2007; Haisley & Weber, 2010). This lack of
transparency creates somementalwiggle room, which allows
for maintenance of a positive self-image despite seemingly
anti-social actions (e.g., Mazar, On & Ariely, 2008; Rabin,
1995). Thus, in the DfE task, people could potentially justify
their selecting the not-yet-materialized bad outcomes for the
other person by engaging in wishful thinking and assuming
that, despite the non-maximizing choice, a relatively high
outcome might still occur.
The experience-based task used here introduces empirical
uncertainty about the possible outcomes into a social-choice
task. Similarly, greater uncertainty about another person’s
motives is associated with less cooperative behavior; for ex-
ample, introducing uncertainty about another person’s pre-
vious choices into a repeated prisoner’s dilemma leads to
less cooperation (Fudenberg, Rand & Dreber, 2012; Güth,
Mugera, Musau & Ploner, 2014). This study builds on these
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findings, demonstrating that uncertainty not only increases
selfish behavior, but can even lead to anti-social behavior.
The design of our studies allows elimination of several
alternative explanations for the results. First, participants
classified as anti-social were not indifferent with respect to
the other person’s outcomes — choices for others systemati-
cally differed from random choice both for choice situations
with a risk-return trade-off and for the classification choices
(Figures 2 and 4). In addition, participants learned the val-
ues of the different sets, as they consistently selected for
themselves the same high-EV decks that they denied to oth-
ers. Moreover, excluding those who performed poorly in
a task where participants had to distinguish decks by their
variability in Experiment 2 did not change the results. Our
conclusions, however, must be tempered by the observation
that participants also exhibited increased levels of anti-social
behavior in a single question under certainty, when asked di-
rectly to give a large or small amount to oneself and another
participant. This task differed from the SVO tasks in that
participants chose one outcome for themselves and one for
the other person, whereas they chose distributions for both
players at once in the SVO. The answers to this single choice
suggest that, in addition to shifting to experience-based ques-
tions, other changes to the answer format might also trigger
more anti-social behavior.
The observed increase in risk aversion for others in these
experience-based decisions resembles behavior in some
studies when decisions are based on summary descriptions
(e.g., Raynold et al., 2009), though other description-based
studies have instead found more risk seeking for others (e.g.,
Chakravarty et al., 2011). Anti-social motives, as found
here, might help provide an explanation as to why people
sometimes choose more riskily and sometimes less so for
others with described choices: When choosing between two
options with different variances, if the higher variance op-
tion is more attractive to the decision maker, people may
act more risk averse for others because they, anti-socially,
choose this attractive high-variance option less often for oth-
ers (as was the case with the risk-return trade-off trials in our
experiments). If, however, the low-variance option is more
attractive to the decision maker, people may, anti-socially,
select the low-variance less often for others, producing more
risk-seeking (as was the case in the classification trials in
Exp. 2). Whether this line of reasoning about anti-social
motives applies to description-based choices is an open ques-
tion. At first glance, the explicit descriptions of probabilistic
outcomes would seem to provide less mental wiggle room
to justify a bad choice for another person (Haisely & Weber,
2010). Nonetheless, wishful thinking about the unrealized
outcomes is still possible, even when the odds and outcomes
are fully described.
Our results have implications for other, related situations
where people make decisions for others. For example, one
design variation in the literature examines choices for a team
including the decider, so that choices for self and other are
not separate (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Rohde & Ro-
hde, 2011). It would be interesting to see in future studies
whether a similar share of anti-social people would also be
present when those who choose a bad option for the team
would also suffer themselves. There is also some related
research on how people predict the risk attitudes of others.
People can be very inaccurate when predicting other people’s
risk preferences (Faro&Rottenstreich, 2006; Hsee&Weber,
1997); this inaccuracy could be a further reason why they
choose differently for others. It would be interesting to exam-
ine whether predictions about other people’s preferences are
more or less accurate after the decision maker experiences
the outcomes rather than reading descriptions of them. Fi-
nally, choices for others can occur not only in the monetary
realm, but also in the social domain, as in, for example,
romantic relationships (e.g., Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, All-
gaier, 2003). In these instances, experience-based learning
might have an even more pronounced effect on choices than
in the monetary domain because non-monetary outcomes
might be more memorable once experienced.
Social preferences differ significantly under risk or un-
certainty relative to certainty (Bolton, et al., 2015; Bradler,
2009). Given the uncertainty in our daily interactions and in
the economy more generally, measuring social preferences
only under certainty (e.g., in a dictator game) may underesti-
mate the role that anti-social behavior plays in daily life. Our
experiments suggest that categorizations based on the SVO
Questionnaire may underestimate the role of competitive be-
havior under uncertainty, though the continuous SVO mea-
sure does capture some of the individual differences (Exp.
2). Prosocial preferences thus do seem to generalize across
certainty and uncertainty, but there are also considerable in-
dividual differences in how people deal with uncertainty that
are not captured by social preferences under certainty (Roch
& Samuelson, 1997). People may, for example, differ in the
degree they create and use the mental wiggle room that pro-
vides for plausible deniability in highly uncertain situations.
The high level of anti-social behavior in the current DfE
task is more congruent with the competitive motives ob-
served in real-world studies of the links between happiness
and income rank (Clark & Oswald, 1996) than with behav-
ior typically observed in laboratory studies of prosociality
(Engel, 2011). Our results suggest that, in the real world, a
key difference that enables the expression of such anti-social
behavior is the level of uncertainty. In line with this idea,
people use the risk in the outcome of a donation to a charity
as an excuse not to give (Exley, 2015). Similarly, returning
to the example from the introduction, making decisions that
affect one’s own career path or the career paths of peers is
only indirectly connected to income levels, which are known
only with uncertainty. Reducing the uncertainty of potential
future outcomes would thus seem to be one way to increase
prosociality.
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